Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Credits and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
- 2 Distributed Optimization
- 3 Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form
- 4 Computing Solution Concepts of Normal-Form Games
- 5 Games with Sequential Actions: Reasoning and Computing with the Extensive Form
- 6 Richer Representations: Beyond the Normal and Extensive Forms
- 7 Learning and Teaching
- 8 Communication
- 9 Aggregating Preferences: Social Choice
- 10 Protocols for Strategic Agents: Mechanism Design
- 11 Protocols for Multiagent Resource Allocation: Auctions
- 12 Teams of Selfish Agents: An Introduction to Coalitional Game Theory
- 13 Logics of Knowledge and Belief
- 14 Beyond Belief: Probability, Dynamics, and Intention
- Appendices: Technical Background
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Credits and Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Distributed Constraint Satisfaction
- 2 Distributed Optimization
- 3 Introduction to Noncooperative Game Theory: Games in Normal Form
- 4 Computing Solution Concepts of Normal-Form Games
- 5 Games with Sequential Actions: Reasoning and Computing with the Extensive Form
- 6 Richer Representations: Beyond the Normal and Extensive Forms
- 7 Learning and Teaching
- 8 Communication
- 9 Aggregating Preferences: Social Choice
- 10 Protocols for Strategic Agents: Mechanism Design
- 11 Protocols for Multiagent Resource Allocation: Auctions
- 12 Teams of Selfish Agents: An Introduction to Coalitional Game Theory
- 13 Logics of Knowledge and Belief
- 14 Beyond Belief: Probability, Dynamics, and Intention
- Appendices: Technical Background
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter and the next we discuss cooperative situations in which agents collaborate to achieve a common goal. This goal can be viewed as shared between the agents or, alternatively, as the goal of a central designer who is designing the various agents. Of course, if such a designer exists, a natural question is why it matters that there are multiple agents; they can be viewed merely as end sensors and effectors for executing the plan devised by the designer. However, there exist situations in which a problem needs to be solved in a distributed fashion, either because a central controller is not feasible or because one wants to make good use of the distributed resources. A good example is provided by sensor networks. Such networks consist of multiple processing units, each with local sensor capabilities, limited processing power, limited power supply, and limited communication bandwidth. Despite these limitations, these networks aim to provide some global service. Figure 1.1 shows an example of a fielded sensor network used for monitoring environmental quantities like humidity, temperature and pressure in an office environment. Each sensor can monitor only its local area and, similarly, can communicate only with other sensors in its local vicinity. The question is what algorithm the individual sensors should run so that the center can still piece together a reliable global picture.
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- Information
- Multiagent SystemsAlgorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations, pp. 1 - 18Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008