Military regimes may attempt to co-opt or displace political parties; in Uruguay, little success was achieved in either direction. Continuing reliance was therefore placed on repression, and in the case of the Left the military's aim was permanent destruction. Yet the effect of attempted elimination by an authoritarian regime can be to force a party's leaders into exile and to force its cadres underground, without totally disarticulating its organization, as happened, for example, to the Communist party in Uruguay. One result can be the breakup of parties into rival factions disputing a common heritage, as happened to the Christian Democratic party and the pro-Tupamaro “26th of March” movement. These factions may survive or they may wither, possibly even to the point of exhausting the lineage. Other policies pursued by authoritarian regimes may have unintended consequences, particularly where they achieve socioeconomic modernization, or simply change. In Uruguay, it was the unintended effects of the military's political strategy that had the most impact on parties, causing them to revive. In 1976, the military stipulated by means of the Fourth Institutional Act that only the most cooperative leaders would be allowed to engage in political activity. Over the next four years an obscure commission slowly began to “deproscribe” the military's allies.

Following the disaster of defeat in the plebiscite, the military's long-term plan – to strengthen and purge the traditional parties – was not abandoned.