Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Juan Linz
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: Political parties, theories of regime change, and the Uruguayan case
- PART I THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES
- PART II FROM AUTHORITARIAN CRISIS TO TRANSITION
- PART III POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
- Conclusion: Parties and regime change – some lessons and comparisons
- Appendix
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
Summary
What lessons can the examination of a single (at times singular) case produce for the study of comparative politics? The implications of this study regarding the importance of parties, and their specific roles in regime change, are broader than they might appear. Detailed case studies often can reveal important issues that have been neglected in previous theoretical discussions or broad comparative works. But the divide between case studies and comparison can be overstated: Serious comparative work cannot proceed without the richness of empirical evidence that case studies generate, and case studies in turn are immensely more interesting when informed by theories and comparisons. This conclusion therefore seeks to blend the specific lessons of the Uruguayan transition with broader comparisons to other cases.
The role of Uruguayan parties in the rise and fall of authoritarianism
By the early 1970s, the behaviors of at least some sections of all major Uruguayan parties were semiloyal (or even disloyal) to democracy. Abdication of responsibility by politicians eventually occurred in the form of refusal to form coalitions, as well as failure to come to the aid of the president when he was faced by a military rebellion. Indeed, most political sectors at one time or another encouraged military role expansion, hoping it would work to their advantage. It is plausible that despite the wave of authoritarianism that was sweeping Latin America in the 1960s, different strategies by political leaders might have prevented a military coup in Uruguay.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Negotiating DemocracyPoliticians and Generals in Uruguay, pp. 239 - 248Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1991