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CHAPTER XXV - Diplomatic history of the second world war
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2008
Summary
The fundamental differences between the democracies and the dictatorships, National Socialist, Fascist or Communist, in the second world war can be seen in their diplomacy as in their military strategy. The conciliation of neutrals, the maintenance of smooth relations between allies, a realisation that in the long run national claims must take account of the interests of other powers, all these features of a prudent diplomacy were far more evident on the side of the democracies. German policy since Bismarck, whether under William II or under the Weimar Republic, had never been remarkable for a sense of limits. Hitler exaggerated the faults of earlier régimes; the crude maxims set out in Mein Kampf really represented the sum of his political ideas just as the Blitzkrieg, a sudden and overwhelming deployment of superior force, was his favourite method. He carried out important diplomatic moves mainly by personal interviews in which he could use his tactics of bluster and cunning. He paid little attention to his professional advisers—indeed he regarded the German Foreign Office as politically unreliable—and rarely tried to get the free, wholehearted assent even of his allies. At his meetings with Mussolini Hitler did nearly all the talking; his Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who reflected his master's qualities as far as his limited ability allowed, was no less domineering at his interviews with Ciano, and the German military chiefs hardly troubled to hide their contempt for the Italians. There was no German-Italian liaison at a high level corresponding to the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff at Washington.
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- The New Cambridge Modern History , pp. 798 - 818Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1968