Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Acknowledgements
- Preface: the confusing world of social mobility
- one ‘There’s a lot of it about’
- two Log cabins and field marshals’ batons
- three Politicians rediscover social mobility
- four Documenting mobility
- five Tracing the origins
- six Why low, why now?
- seven The pessimism of earlier academic mobility analysis
- eight The emergence of a new society
- nine The new mobility regime
- ten Misconceptions of schooling and meritocracy
- eleven Tightening bonds and professional access
- twelve Moving on
- Appendix
- References
- Index
six - Why low, why now?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables and figures
- Acknowledgements
- Preface: the confusing world of social mobility
- one ‘There’s a lot of it about’
- two Log cabins and field marshals’ batons
- three Politicians rediscover social mobility
- four Documenting mobility
- five Tracing the origins
- six Why low, why now?
- seven The pessimism of earlier academic mobility analysis
- eight The emergence of a new society
- nine The new mobility regime
- ten Misconceptions of schooling and meritocracy
- eleven Tightening bonds and professional access
- twelve Moving on
- Appendix
- References
- Index
Summary
It is not easy to separate the rise of political interest in mobility from the assumption that mobility rates have been too low. Put simply, the attraction of the latter is that something in society is broken and needs to be fixed. There would have been little mileage in talking about mobility as if there were no problem with mobility rates, whereas the call to increase mobility fitted well with a moderate reforming agenda, typified by Blair's ‘education, education, education’ refrain. But all of the political parties could invoke mobility – with its party-neutral associations of efficient use of talent, and moral fairness – in their own causes. Thus mobility could be bent to meet party needs, whether expressing Labour ideals of equality or Tory values of individual achievement or economic efficiency. Mobility could mean all things to all men (or women).
From the politicians’ point of view, mobility offered two somewhat more cynical attractions. It provided a stick with which all parties could beat their opponents over their failure to promote mobility; a stick that could be wielded (by all parties) without having to go into technical details because the widespread, common-sense public perceptions were sufficient basis for generalisations and unfounded claims. For example, in reply to a question that implied social mobility rates were low, the Leader of the Liberal Democrats attacked Labour's assumption ‘that people's life chances are blighted at birth. That is why I am so proud that this coalition Government – across the coalition – have dedicated so much time and resources in rectifying the mistakes of the previous Labour Government’ (Clegg 2014) and subsequently offered a list of Coalition measures that would increase opportunities of social mobility.
Second, policies aimed at changing mobility rates – such as improving early childhood conditions, better educational access or even recruitment to the professions – all take a whole generation to bear fruit. By that time, the churn of ministerial appointments – the average tenure of office is down to 1.3 years (Cleary and Reeves 2009) – means that ministers will be long gone and therefore not answerable for their actions. Mobility was therefore a pretty safe card to play.
It also resonated with the life experiences of leading political figures. Older ministers and civil servants had lived through the 1960s and 1970s, experiencing first hand the social changes of that era.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The New Social MobilityHow the Politicians Got It Wrong, pp. 73 - 88Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2017