There is little that is self-evident about the terms in which Nietzsche judges the Western tradition of moral thought. Clearly, he seeks to expose the false pretensions of morality, its lies, illusions, delusions, fabrications, and fictions; and he hints that much greater things will follow on morality's demise. His writing forcefully evokes the conditions of human existence that lead him to pass a negative judgment on the morality of the “weak” and the “sick.” We are acquainted, through the extraordinary pungency of his expressive style, with his contempt not only for many forms but many nuances of life—for “life” appears in Nietzsche's inimitable sketches as life compressed, compromised, and revealed in its smallest gestures, by the poses its actors strike, betrayed by its petty comforts, compensations, and tastes. But for all that, Nietzsche's own perspective is always hard to pin down. The meaning of the terms “slave” and “noble” in On the Genealogy of Morals is, at least in part, given by the stark antithesis between the contemptible figure and the glorious one, judgments which often structure his commentary on morality. Nonetheless, these terms of judgment do not themselves remain static or unqualified, because other terms of judgment are brought to bear on them, qualifying their force. Thus the slaves who are “sick” are also “clever” (GM I §10); the perversity of the ascetic priest makes man “interesting” (GM I §6); Nietzsche even vouches for the value of the experience of sickness and suffering for the development of human spirituality (GS, Preface; BGE §225 and §270).