By 1992, Obasanjo's hostility to Babangida's political deviousness and structural reform programme had become a determination to oblige the president and the military as a whole to withdraw from power with as much dignity as could be preserved, so that Nigeria could share in the democratisation taking place throughout the continent. In this, Obasanjo failed, a failure that brought shame to the army, misery to Nigerians, and imprisonment to himself.

The charming, clever, and enigmatic Babangida fascinated Nigerians. Nearly twenty years after leaving office he had still not explained the manner of his departure. Many believed that he had clung to power for as long as possible, perhaps hoping to convert himself into a civilian president. Some thought that he had manoeuvred himself into a situation from which he was glad to escape alive. The truth may have been more complicated, involving two central actors rather than one. When he took power, Babangida envisaged himself as ‘the architect of a modern Nigeria’. Not only did he call himself president, but he reportedly commissioned a paper on Nasser's model of government. Yet he had made the lack of progress towards democracy a reason for ousting Buhari and he knew that he might suffer the same fate if he did not institute a transition. Once that programme began, however, it became increasingly difficult to stop, except by violent means, while at the same time it both revealed Nigeria's politicians at their most irresponsibly competitive and strengthened elements in the army opposed to restoring civilian rule in any form.