Proponents of a no-first-use proposal generally emphasize the distinctive dangers posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, the most serious of which is the possibility of their use in international conflict. An objective of a no-first-use proposal is to make less likely the introduction of nuclear weapons into armed conflict between states. In so doing, this policy seeks primarily to encourage the perception of these weapons as illegitimate instruments of conflict, and thus to promote a concept of defense planning that satisfies security interests without relying upon nuclear weapons, save in the instance when the enemy uses them first. Several of the bases for favoring a no-first-use proposal have been set forth with admirable clarity in Professor Tucker’s imaginative essay. I should like, however, to discuss some further considerations that, when added to those discussed by Tucker, account for my support of such a proposal either as a unilateral measure or as a negotiated international agreement with one or more foreign states.

A no-first-use policy is only a partial substitute for those more fundamental changes in the international environment that are now believed to be a necessary, although unattainable, adaptation to the existence of nuclear weapons, such as the development of a stable peace system requiring comprehensive disarmament and substantial world government.