Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Ontological arguments and belief in God
- Introduction
- 1 Some historical considerations
- 2 Definitional arguments
- 3 Conceptual arguments
- 4 Modal arguments
- 5 Meinongian arguments
- 6 Experiential arguments
- 7 “Hegelian” arguments
- 8 Application to historical arguments
- 9 Are there (other) global objections to ontological arguments?
- 10 Is existence a predicate?
- 11 The uses of parody
- 12 Are ontological arguments of any use to theists and/or atheists?
- Conclusion
- Literature notes
- Bibliography
- Index
11 - The uses of parody
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Ontological arguments and belief in God
- Introduction
- 1 Some historical considerations
- 2 Definitional arguments
- 3 Conceptual arguments
- 4 Modal arguments
- 5 Meinongian arguments
- 6 Experiential arguments
- 7 “Hegelian” arguments
- 8 Application to historical arguments
- 9 Are there (other) global objections to ontological arguments?
- 10 Is existence a predicate?
- 11 The uses of parody
- 12 Are ontological arguments of any use to theists and/or atheists?
- Conclusion
- Literature notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Throughout these chapters, I have often adverted to arguments that parody the ontological arguments under consideration. In this section, I wish to collect together the different sorts of parodies that might be made of ontological arguments and to consider the uses to which they might be put. I shall divide the initial discussion according to the different conceptions of God that are invoked in the arguments.
BEINGS OF KIND K THAN WHICH NO GREATER BEINGS OF KIND K CAN BE CONCEIVED
We have already seen that Gaunilo maintained that St. Anselm's argument could be paralleled with an argument that purports to establish the existence of an island than which no greater island can be conceived. Moreover, there seems to be nothing special about Gaunilo's choice of ‘island’ in this example: If he is right, it seems that St. Anselm's argument can be paralleled by an argument that purports to establish the existence of a being of kind K than which no greater being of kind K can be conceived, for any kind of object K.
Some kinds K of objects make for more plausible parallels to St. Anselm's ontological arguments than do others. In particular, given that it is a premise of the argument that a being of kind K than which no greater being of kind K can be conceived and that actually exists is greater than a being of kind K than which no greater being of kind K can be conceived but that does not actually exist, there are kinds that make for prima facie implausible parallels.
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- Ontological Arguments and Belief in God , pp. 162 - 185Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996