Their negotiations with German representatives in Istanbul from August through October 1914 reveal an Ottoman leadership that viewed participation in the war as an acceptable but perhaps avoidable policy, and sought to delay entry for as long as possible. The goal was to preserve the German–Ottoman alliance and the ability to draw on German assistance during the war and, even more importantly, after the war, with no great expenditure of Ottoman resources or blood.

At least theoretically, Ottoman decision-makers still enjoyed two alternatives. The first – alignment with the Entente – would have entailed the dismissal of the three German military missions from the empire, headed respectively by General Liman von Sanders, Admiral Souchon, and Admiral Usedom, and consisting of over a thousand German officers and personnel. The loss of this military aid effectively would have meant Ottoman demobilization and future reliance on Britain, France, and/or Russia. The second entailed commitment to and financial reliance on Germany, and consequently the willingness to participate in the war on the side of the Central Powers. This second option held the promise of long-term international security and economic development in the framework of a Great Power alliance. Said Halim Pasha, in particular, viewed the alliance chiefly as a means to long-term Ottoman recovery.