Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The paradox of predictivism
- Chapter 2 Epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements
- Chapter 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism
- Chapter 5 The predicting community
- Chapter 6 Back to epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 7 Postlude on old evidence
- Chapter 8 A paradox resolved
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Chapter 6 - Back to epistemic pluralism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Chapter 1 The paradox of predictivism
- Chapter 2 Epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 3 Predictivism and the Periodic Table of the Elements
- Chapter 4 Miracle arguments and the demise of strong predictivism
- Chapter 5 The predicting community
- Chapter 6 Back to epistemic pluralism
- Chapter 7 Postlude on old evidence
- Chapter 8 A paradox resolved
- Glossary
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
I argued in Chapter 2 that there is a long tradition in Western epistemology of epistemic individualism. While this is true, epistemic pluralism has always had its proponents as well. In Plato's dialogue Laches, for example, the character of Socrates argues that it is important to care what people think about what one does, so long as the people whose opinions are valued are credible authorities on the matter at hand. If one's goal is athletic excellence, then, the opinion of the competent trainer is of great importance. I have explicated the notion of an agent's epistemic authority in terms of the concept of the agent's background beliefs.
The background beliefs of endorsers and evaluators have played a central role in the account of predictivism I have developed in the previous three chapters. I have been deliberately vague about what kinds of beliefs may constitute background beliefs. An agent's beliefs, according to me, are simply all the propositions to which the agent (explicitly or implicitly) assigns probabilities that are very near one. Thus any theoretical, methodological, or metaphysical claim which was accorded such a probability by an agent would count as a belief – my presumption is that when an agent assigns a probability to some claim that falls short of being near one, the agent typically has as a basis for such a probability a set of background beliefs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Paradox of Predictivism , pp. 190 - 216Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008