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    • Publisher:
      Cambridge University Press
      Publication date:
      15 April 2021
      13 May 2021
      ISBN:
      9781108582377
      9781108730532
      DOI:
      https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108582377
      Dimensions:
      Weight & Pages:
      Dimensions:
      (229 x 152 mm)
      Weight & Pages:
      0.11kg, 68 Pages
      • Series:
      Elements in Ethics
      Subjects:
      Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
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    Series:
    Elements in Ethics
    Subjects:
    Philosophy: General Interest, Ethics, Philosophy
    Information

    Book description

    Derek Parfit (1942–2017) was one of the most important and influential moral philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This Element offers a critical introduction to his wide-ranging ethical thought, focusing especially on his two most significant works, Reasons and Persons (1984) and On What Matters (2011), and their contribution to the consequentialist moral tradition. Topics covered include: rationality and objectivity, distributive justice, self-defeating moral theories, Parfit's Triple Theory (according to which consequentialism, contractualism, and Kantian ethics ultimately converge), personal identity, and population ethics.

    References

    References

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