Up until now, we have set aside the question of Rousseau's rhetorical strategy. We have not yet asked why Rousseau sometimes quite boldly equates the original and the natural, even though he does not think they are equivalent. It seemed enough to show that he ultimately rejects the proposition that nature is that which exists at the beginning and accepts instead the proposition that nature is an end or perfection. Whatever reasons Rousseau may have had for advancing the equation of the original and natural in the Preface to the Second Discourse, I believe I have demonstrated, in light of subsequent developments in the Second Discourse, and in light of Emile, that he does not, finally, endorse it. Similarly, it did not seem necessary to ask why Rousseau sometimes makes it appear that unity is both what human beings need above all for happiness and the objective of his political, social, and moral prescriptions. It seemed enough to show that the objective of those prescriptions is instead the “savage pattern,” in which opposing elements of the human good, which cannot be unified or synthesized, are able at least to coexist. While my arguments have taken Rousseau to be a careful writer, they do not rest on any particular conception of Rousseau's rhetorical strategy. Up until now, I have done my best to base my reading on the preponderance of textual evidence, without recourse to controversial theories about how to interpret a text.