Ammonius, On Aristotle’s On Interpretation 5.24–6.6

None of those who have been seriously engaged with Aristotle’s writings thought it right to raise doubts about this book being a genuine work of the philosopher . . . except for Andronicus of Rhodes, the eleventh [head of the school] after Aristotle, when he heard him in the prologue of this book calling thoughts ‘affections [pathēmata] of the soul’ and adding ‘as has been said about them in the [work] On the Soul’. Because he did not see where in the treatise On the Soul the philosopher called thoughts affections of the soul, he thought that one of the two treatises, this one and the one On the Soul, should be declared as a spurious [work] of Aristotle, and he thought one should reject this one rather than the one On the Soul. But one should note that in many places in On the Soul we have imagination called by the philosopher ‘intellect that can be affected’.

Philoponus, On Aristotle’s On the Soul 27.21–8

On the basis of this passage [On the Soul 1.1.402a9] we refute Andronicus of Rhodes, who declared On Interpretation to be spurious. For when Aristotle says there that thoughts are affections [pathēmata] in the soul as has been said in On the Soul, Andronicus says that this is not found anywhere in On the Soul, so that it is necessary to regard either On the Soul or On Interpretation as spurious. But it is agreed that On the Soul is by Aristotle; so On Interpretation [must be] spurious. Now we say that here, by ‘affections [pathē] proper to the soul’ Aristotle meant nothing other than thoughts, so that this was what he meant in On Interpretation.