It might now seem time to turn to look at Abelard's treatment of universals. But there is an important preliminary. In his various discussions of universals, Abelard makes extensive use of his developing ideas about perception and knowledge. His theory of cognition therefore provides a background against which his theory of universals, and the changes he makes to it, become easier to understand. Here, as in his ontology, Abelard starts from a body of philosophical material transmitted in ancient logical works, but often reinterprets it in accord with his own views, becoming bolder the more he writes and thinks about the area.

COGNITION: ABELARD'S SOURCES

Abelard developed his account of human cognition on the basis of Aristotle – as transmitted by Boethius in his logical commentaries. Aristotle's analysis of cognition (found in the De anima, to which Abelard had no direct access) rests on his metaphysics of matter, form, potency and act. The interpretation of Aristotle's theory has been controversial since antiquity and remains so. The sketch which follows is intended only to set out roughly some points which will be important for understanding Abelard.

Aristotle presents the senses and, for the most part, the intellect as receptive rather than active. Just as, in sensual perception, the senses take on the accidental forms which they perceive (my touch becomes hot from the form of hotness), so in intellectual perception the intellect is informed by the substantial form which makes the thing perceived the sort of thing it is. The form man informs matter to make a particular man, but it also informs the potentiality of my intellect when I think of a man.