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2 - Manichean Identities and Normative Scheming: Origins

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2009

Consuelo Cruz
Affiliation:
Tufts University, Massachusetts
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Summary

… language serves to declare what is advantageous and what is the reverse, and it is the peculiarity of man that he alone … possesses a perception of good and evil, of the just and the unjust … and it is association in [a common perception of] these things which makes a family and a polis.

–Aristotle

In part because Aristotle was right, polities are at base regimes for the arbitration of contending claims to a wide range of valuable resources, from authority and prestige to access and control of capital and labor. An intuitively appealing view of arbitration regimes posits that their legitimacy ultimately rests on the contenders' conviction that the judges are not self-interested and that the rules are fair. But in fact, these particular strictures need not encumber a legitimate arbitration regime. People may well widely perceive a self-interested arbiter, so long as he or she stands for a greater righteousness, as their rightful judge. Moreover, rules that are just may be repudiated on the basis of their unfair application; and conversely, unjust rules may be accepted if they are perceived to be fairly applied.

In sixteenth century Spanish America, arbitration hinged on the authority of the royal sovereign. The king unabashedly protected the interests of the Crown. But the Crown belonged to the king only because as sovereign he possessed specific, emblematic attributes, such as benevolence, wisdom, and Christian zeal.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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