Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Table
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Egalitarian Turn in Liberalism
- 3 Where Liberalism Falls Short
- 4 The Problem of Contingency
- 5 Accounting for Uncertain Opportunities
- 6 A Social Analysis of Institutional Luck
- 7 Markets Are Not Morally Neutral
- 8 Conclusion: The Tasks of Engaged Liberal Social Theory
- References
- Index
8 - Conclusion: The Tasks of Engaged Liberal Social Theory
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 January 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Miscellaneous Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Table
- Acknowledgements
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Egalitarian Turn in Liberalism
- 3 Where Liberalism Falls Short
- 4 The Problem of Contingency
- 5 Accounting for Uncertain Opportunities
- 6 A Social Analysis of Institutional Luck
- 7 Markets Are Not Morally Neutral
- 8 Conclusion: The Tasks of Engaged Liberal Social Theory
- References
- Index
Summary
Conceptualizing distributional justice as a response to chances – whether by equalizing them or tacitly accepting them – is different from understanding justice as a product of providence, fate or cosmological intentions. Thinking about life chances in capitalist liberal democracies concedes to four conceptual preconditions. The first is admitting that contingency makes a moral difference. The second presumes a world of regularities. Closely related is a third point, which is the existence of people and populations who bear the consequences of brute and institutional luck. Lastly, there is a belief that justice expressed as life chances is suitable and necessary. This does not mean that the regular occurrence of luck undermines agency. Rather, it reveals patterns of decision making and causality in given environmental conditions and social relations.
C. Wright Mills holds that a ‘sociological conception of fate’ relies upon ‘events in history that are beyond the control of any circle or groups of men (1) compact enough to be identifiable, (2) powerful enough to decide with consequence, and (3) in a position to foresee the consequences and so to be held accountable for historical events’ (1959, 21). In my view, the political economy of global capitalism meets these criteria. It is a discrete process beyond the control of many and has identifiable consequences, all of which can be foreseen.
With respect to equality and economic activity, it makes little sense to suggest or imply that people should carry the costs of hardships that stem from economic affairs. Similarly, given contingency, there is little to be gained from being excessively mean-spirited to those who make unwise decisions. Unquestionably, people are often negligent, but this should not disqualify them from accessing publicly funded programmes, for instance. There are compelling reasons for compassion for social circumstances. Plus, there can be an awareness of the possible causes that shaped the person and that contributed to their state. In other words, we must pair the contingent formation of the person with empathy for them, just as we hope they do for us.
Understanding life chances requires an analysis distinguishing between predictable occurrences and simple happenstance. In the final assessment, this is so that we can increase the autonomy of persons. Presently, the well off, well educated and well placed have a great deal of autonomy when it comes to the pursuit of quality of life.
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- Information
- The Political Economy of Fortune and MisfortuneProspects for Prosperity in Our Times, pp. 139 - 148Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2023