Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Aging, Illness, and Addiction
- 3 The Exacerbation of Personality: Woodrow Wilson
- 4 Leading While Dying: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1943–1945
- 5 Addicted to Power: John F. Kennedy
- 6 Bordering on Sanity: Richard Nixon
- 7 The Twenty-fifth Amendment
- 8 Presidential Care
- Appendix: Foreign Leadership and Medical Intelligence: The Shah of Iran and the Carter Administration
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
1 - Introduction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 May 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Aging, Illness, and Addiction
- 3 The Exacerbation of Personality: Woodrow Wilson
- 4 Leading While Dying: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1943–1945
- 5 Addicted to Power: John F. Kennedy
- 6 Bordering on Sanity: Richard Nixon
- 7 The Twenty-fifth Amendment
- 8 Presidential Care
- Appendix: Foreign Leadership and Medical Intelligence: The Shah of Iran and the Carter Administration
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, many Americans wondered why groups such as Al-Qaeda might hate America so much. Yet even violent and horrific acts often originate in real or perceived events that provide context, if not justification. American involvement in Middle Eastern politics has a long and often conflicted history. One such turning point in American foreign policy toward Arabic countries in the Middle East has received relatively little attention. The opportunities that the United States squandered with Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser prior to the Suez Crisis in 1956 appear even more tragic because decisions made then resulted, at least in part, from President Eisenhower's heart attack in September 1955, which forced him to turn over much of the responsibility for policy in the region to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Dulles's more intransigent views on the situation then held sway over subsequent Eisenhower administration policy.
When the United Nations separated Palestine into two separate states, one Jewish and one Arab, in November 1947, the Arab states remained antagonistic to the Zionists in their midst. On May 10, 1948, members of the Arab League, including Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, were crushed in their invasion of the Jewish state by the much smaller Israeli military. Nonetheless, this defeat did not force the Arab states to recognize Israel. Egypt's Nasser believed that he needed more arms in order to launch an effective assault on Israel.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007