Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 British Interests in Spanish America
- 2 Privateering and Piracy
- 3 Traders' Ghastly Wounds
- 4 Response to Insurgent Privateering
- 5 Reponse to Spanish Privateering
- 6 The Anglo-Spanish Claims Commission
- 7 Response to Cuban-based Piracy
- Conclusion: Maritime Predation, Legal Posturing and Power
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Response to Insurgent Privateering
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of abbreviations
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 British Interests in Spanish America
- 2 Privateering and Piracy
- 3 Traders' Ghastly Wounds
- 4 Response to Insurgent Privateering
- 5 Reponse to Spanish Privateering
- 6 The Anglo-Spanish Claims Commission
- 7 Response to Cuban-based Piracy
- Conclusion: Maritime Predation, Legal Posturing and Power
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Castlereagh was busily orchestrating a foreign policy that would bring about the defeat of France when he began to receive reports of insurgent privateering in 1813. This overriding foreign policy objective meant that with regard to Spanish America, Castlereagh was steering a neutral course that would allow British merchants to access Spanish American markets without jeopardising the Anglo-Spanish alliance. Given the importance of these broader concerns, Castlereagh paid little attention to reports that a small number of privateers from Cartagena were harassing a few British merchants trading in the West Indies. Letters from Admirals requesting additional instructions thus went without decisive reply. However, such reports and requests continued to arrive at the Foreign office so that by December 1814, Castlereagh was forced to give insurgent privateering more attention. He submitted the reports of naval officers to the King's Advocate, Christopher Robinson, to find out what might legally be done to protect British trade and shipping.
Robinson immediately recognised the political complexities of protecting British trade against insurgent privateers. He warned Castlereagh that it was ‘a delicate question of a political nature’ how far the rebel states should be recognised as independent governments ‘entitled to issue Letters of Marque that shall under the plea of Rights of War interrupt the Trade of British Ships’. The problem stemmed from Britain's neutrality. By adopting this position, Castlereagh had avoided making a definitive statement about the legitimacy of the Spanish American revolutions.
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- Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2013