Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Naturalism is no enemy of free will; it provides a positive account of free will, one that handles the perplexities better, in fact, than those views that try to protect free will from the clutches of science with an “obscure and panicky metaphysics” (in P. F. Strawson's fine phrase).
Daniel DennettThe randomness problem
We saw in the last chapter that the concept of origination is central to libertarian free will and that origination requires some sort of lack of determinism in the decision-making process. Traditionally, libertarians have argued that indeterminism alone is not sufficient to enable free will, for then we would have to equate free will with randomness, which would be as unacceptable as equating it with determinism. Consider the following scenario imagined by the physicist Paul Davies:
If electrodes were planted in your brain and triggered at random by an external source, you would regard that form of interference as a reduction of your freedom: someone “taking over”, or at least impeding, the operation of your brain. How can random quantum quirks inside your head represent anything other than “noise”? You decide to raise your arm, the neurons fire in the correct sequence, but a quantum fluctuation disturbs the signal. Your leg moves instead. Is that freedom?
(Davies 1983: 140)But having insisted that indeterminism is only one condition of free will, it seems very difficult for the libertarian to say what the other conditions may be.
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- The Problem of Free WillA Contemporary Introduction, pp. 23 - 42Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2012