Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - The quagmire of evasion
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What is free will?
- 3 Obscure and panicky metaphysics
- 4 A glaring absurdity
- 5 Weeds in the garden of forking paths
- 6 A wretched subterfuge
- 7 The quagmire of evasion
- 8 Of puppies and polyps
- 9 Two overridden and wearied nags
- 10 Whither free will?
- Further reading: a personal top ten
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, says that its real name is freedom … Now, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered.
William JamesCould have, would have, might have
The compatibilist readily admits that if determinism is true, then we clearly do not have physical alternatives open to us. But this does not matter, he says, for what really matters is that we have the right sort of alternatives open to us, and these are not physical alternatives.
For many compatibilists, perhaps most compatibilists, the right sort of alternatives for free will are what are termed conditional alternatives. They are conditional alternatives since they depend upon certain counter factual conditionals being true. A counterfactual conditional is a type of statement that indicates what would be the case if the conditions that led to a certain state of affairs had been different. For such compatibilists, an agent had an alternative open to him if, had the causal circumstances been slightly different (such that he would have wanted to decide otherwise), he would have decided otherwise (because there would have been nothing to prevent him from realizing that want).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Problem of Free WillA Contemporary Introduction, pp. 97 - 108Publisher: Acumen PublishingPrint publication year: 2012