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II - The Second Gift of the Demiurge: Bond and Proportion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2022

Dirk Baltzly
Affiliation:
Monash University, Victoria
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Summary

It is not possible for only two things to be well combined in the absence of some third thing, for there must be some bond between the middle to effect the combination of both. The finest bond is the one which makes both itself and the things that are bound one. (31b9–c4)

The bond in general

In this passage, the bond (desmos) is understood as offering itself as an image of divine unification and the mutual sharing of powers in virtue of which the intellectual causes of wholes achieve their productions. On the other hand, what is fine is here understood as involving a unifying and binding essence and power. For the words well combined and the finest of bonds both appear to me to have this signification. Beginning, therefore, from the Dyad as something aligned with (suzugos) Generation, Procession and Difference, he introduces unification to the things that participate in the Dyad and also harmonious association through the bond – this gift being the second of the things given to the cosmos by the Demiurge.

I beg the misinterpreters of Plato not to raise any of the following objections against his discourse:

  • (1) Those who say that semicircles require no kind of bond in the generation of the circle do not speak correctly. For the circle is not established from semicircles but rather the opposite is the case. For when the circle already exists – and not as something composed out of semicircles – then when the diameter is drawn then at that point semicircles are made. The name itself proves this, since ‘semicircle’ has its derivation from ‘circle’ and not vice versa.

  • (2) Neither are those who take it that the monad and the dyad are somehow opposed and have no middle correct. For Plato does not say simply that in the case of things of whatever character, there is something between them, but says instead that in the case of such things as are intended to complete the subsistence (hupostasis) of a single composite, [there is something else between the things joined]. Hence, he said that ‘it is impossible to combine two things well alone separate from a third thing’, and the monad and the dyad are not opposites since the dyad is made of monads.

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