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6 - Social Norms and the Banker's Gold Watch

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 March 2017

Timothy Frye
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York
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Summary

This gold watch remains mine only as long as everybody around me agrees that it really belongs to me. If 90 percent of my neighbors should think different, I wouldn't be able to sleep soundly anymore.

Anonymous Russian banker (Yakovlev 2006: 1053)

Property rights define distributions of assets, create economic incentives, and ultimately shape the material base of society. As illustrated by the quote above, however, the security of property rights also has a normative dimension. Social norms that support a given distribution of property rights may reassure right-holders that their property rights will be respected, but where social norms undercut the existing allocation of property rights, right-holders rightly fear expropriations in ways both big and small (Dmitriev 2006; Hoff and Stiglitz 2004). Indeed, right-holders themselves often devote considerable effort to shaping social norms in ways that perpetuate the continued enjoyment of their rights via programs of corporate social responsibility or advertising campaigns. If property rights are broadly viewed as legitimate, then appeals to change them may come to little result.

Social norms about the legitimacy of property rights are often thought to be difficult to change. Denzau and North (1994: 3) emphasize that individual mental models about economic relations are often specific to context and culture and that it may be rational to follow a mental model rooted in culture or myth as long as individuals do not encounter sufficient evidence to disprove these models. If beliefs about property relations and the working of the economy are persistent and difficult to change, this forces us to recalibrate the possibilities for social change. Rather than adapting quickly to new incentives offered by changes in policy and institutions, we would see some individuals clinging to sub-optimal patterns of behavior that are consistent with prior institutional and cultural environments.

There is certainly evidence to support this view. Some find that the culture of origin of an individual or an individual's ancestors continue to shape economic attitudes even after individuals have moved to new institutional environments (Guiso et al. 2006). Still others observe that even after individuals have moved to another country in Europe, the perceived level of corruption in their parent's country of origin continues to shape attitudes about corruption (Simpser 2016).

Type
Chapter
Information
Property Rights and Property Wrongs
How Power, Institutions, and Norms Shape Economic Conflict in Russia
, pp. 163 - 196
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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