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8 - The legal sources of proportionality

from Part II - Proportionality: sources, nature, function

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Aharon Barak
Affiliation:
Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
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Summary

The need for a constitutional entrenchment

Any legal system wishing to adopt proportionality as a criterion for properly limiting constitutional rights through sub-constitutional law must provide a legal foundation for such an adoption. It is insufficient to merely recognize proportionality as a key concept or to simply acknowledge its superiority over other limiting criteria. It would also be insufficient for the common law to recognize it, or even for statutory provisions to do so. Rather, the only legal basis for the application of proportionality as a criterion for the limitation of constitutional rights by sub-constitutional law must be found in the constitution itself, either explicitly or implicitly. Indeed, in order to properly limit a constitutional right by a sub-constitutional law, the law establishing the limitation must rest on a constitutional foundation. What constitutes the constitutional basis of proportionality?

In Israel, the answer to this question appears straightforward. The Israeli Basic Laws contain, within their general limitation clauses, a specific provision stating that any limitation of the constitutional rights established therein must be by law “benefiting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose.” In addition, the limitation clauses must be “to an extent no greater than required.” A similar provision may be found in several other constitutions. Take, for example, an amendment to the Austrian Constitution from 1988. While subsection (1) of the amended provision establishes a constitutional right to freedom, subsection (3) provides:

The deprivation of personal liberty may be legally prescribed only if this is requisite for the purpose of the measure; deprivation of personal liberty may in any instance only occur if and inasmuch as this is not disproportionate to the purpose of the measure.

Similarly, the new Federal Constitution of Switzerland (2000) contains a general limitation clause (Article 36(3)), which includes the following specific language:

Limitations of fundamental rights must be proportionate to the goals pursued.

Another explicit provision relating to proportionality is found in Romania’s Constitution (1991) and in an amendment (2001) to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. Some other constitutions have included within their limitation clauses (either general or specific) special provisions requiring that a limitation of a constitutional right be done in a manner that is “necessary” in a democratic society. From the use of this term – “necessary” – the courts have deduced the proportionality requirement.

Type
Chapter
Information
Proportionality
Constitutional Rights and their Limitations
, pp. 211 - 242
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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References

Mullan, D.The Role for Underlying Constitutional Principles in a Bill of Rights WorldNew Zealand L. Rev 9 2004Google Scholar
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Michelman, F.Constitutional Law of South AfricaCape TownJuta Law Publishers, looseleaf 2002
Allan, T. R. S.The Rule of Law, as Liberal Justice 56 U. Toronto L. J283 2006Google Scholar
Costa, P.Zolo, D. 2007
Walters, M.Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional TheoryCambridge University Press 2008
Kokott, J.Constitutionalism, Universalism, and Democracy – A Comparative Analysis: The German Contributions to the Fifth World Congress of the International Association of Constitutional LawBerlinNomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999

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