This is very much a work in the tradition of Frege and Russell. Perhaps as good a way of ending it as any is to remark on a few of the ways in which its conclusions fit in with Russell's and Frege's views of attitudes and their ascription.

Painting with a broad brush, we can contrast Frege and Russell's views on attitudes as follows. Frege thought that attitudes were not the sort of thing that could be characterized simply in terms of the objects and properties that they are intuitively about. Indeed, he thought ordinary objects and properties were simply the wrong sorts of things to use, in saying what someone believes or wants. Russell, by contrast, thought that workaday objects and properties were essential to attitude characterization. In fact, some of his comments about the multiple-relation theory of belief occasionally suggest the view that a correct characterization of an attitude refers to nothing but the objects and properties that it is about.

These differences are reflected in their views of the behavior of expressions within attitude ascriptions. For Frege, expressions governed by an attitude verb shift their reference from workaday objects and so on to the sorts of things appropriate for attitude characterization.