On August 8, 1990, the finance minister of the newly installed Fujimori government announced price increases. Gasoline would go up more than 3,000%, kerosene almost 7,000%, bread more than 1,500%, and medicines, on average, 1,400%. The inflation rate in August, reflecting these increases, was 400%.

Any government would worry about the political fallout from increases of this magnitude. It was not a coincidence that tanks were stationed on streets in Lima on August 7, the day before the announcement. But the Fujimori government had particular reason to worry. The theme of the new president's campaign had been opposition to a price adjustment or shock; the shock was his first major action upon taking office.

If normally governments in democracies do in office more or less what they promised in campaigns (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge, 1994), Peruvian politics at this juncture was anything but normal. And these were not normal times in other ways as well. A guerrilla movement threatened the state; the state, in response, threatened the security of many citizens. Between 1980 and 1990, 25,000 people died in the conflict. And the economy was simply out of control. In 1989 gross national product (GNP) had fallen by 10.4%, inflation was 2,775%, and the external debt was $19 billion, almost $1,000 per capita.

In these abnormal times, should we expect a normal response of public opinion to changes in the economy? Would people look for immediate improvements, and, if improvement wasn't visible, would they turn against the government and its economic policies?