The 1990s was the era of the Dutch miracle, when international observers lauded the ability of the consensual corporatism of the Netherlands to produce dramatic job growth without introducing the levels of inequality seen in the American labor market. In their well-known study of the Dutch miracle, Visser and Hemerijck highlighted the important role of unions and employers’ associations, cajoled by political reformers, in crafting the political compromises that underlay job growth and welfare reform. This recent story is consistent with the long-prevailing understanding of the Netherlands as an exemplar of liberal corporatism, in which the Dutch economy adjusts to international pressures for change through continuous negotiations between employers and labor unions.

In the area of takeover protection, however, the Netherlands was neither corporatist nor reformist in this period. Instead, a well-organized managerial lobby consistently defeated reform measures supported by both the Liberal Party (VVD) and the lobbying organizations of institutional investors. Despite a twelve-year stint in government between 1994 and 2006, the VVD was unable to effect change in the Dutch market for corporate control. This chapter is an inquiry into the reasons why liberalizing reformers were so unsuccessful in the Netherlands.