Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- 1 Introduction
- PART ONE SOME PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRENDS IN THEIR EVOLUTION
- 2 Demobilized and Demoralized: Negative Ads and Loosening Bonds
- 3 Turning “Citizens” into “Consumers”: Economic Growth and the Level of Public Discourse
- 4 Economic and Cultural Prerequisites for Democracy
- 5 Civil Society and the Contemporary Social Order
- PART TWO MORALS IN POLITICS
- PART THREE SOCIAL CAPITAL
- PART FOUR THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONS
- Index
- References
5 - Civil Society and the Contemporary Social Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Contributors
- 1 Introduction
- PART ONE SOME PROBLEMS WITH DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND TRENDS IN THEIR EVOLUTION
- 2 Demobilized and Demoralized: Negative Ads and Loosening Bonds
- 3 Turning “Citizens” into “Consumers”: Economic Growth and the Level of Public Discourse
- 4 Economic and Cultural Prerequisites for Democracy
- 5 Civil Society and the Contemporary Social Order
- PART TWO MORALS IN POLITICS
- PART THREE SOCIAL CAPITAL
- PART FOUR THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONS
- Index
- References
Summary
In a totalitarian State or in a field already made into State monopoly, those dissatisfied with the institutions that they find can seek a remedy only by seeking to change the Government of the country. In a free society and a free field they have a different remedy; discontented individuals with new ideas can make a new institution to meet their needs. The field is open to experiment and success or failure; secession is the midwife of invention.
INTRODUCTION: REDISCOVERING CIVIL SOCIETY
One of the most fascinating social facts in France is probably the formidable explosion of civil actions. This civil activism has various appearances and goals; however, it seems that people not only increasingly engage in humanitarian causes, they also try to solve institutional problems that fall into the public domain such as pollution, violence, illiteracy, and social exclusion. On the other side, the citizens' desertion from the political arena and the growth of incivilities in schools or suburbs suggest that the French society does not display only such a beautiful side. The point of departure of this chapter is the idea that all those social facts could be linked to each other with the help of an appropriate explanatory framework.
The recognition of the modern growth of civil activism directed to the provision of collective goods has lead to various reactions. Most of them are unsatisfactory since they exclusively rely on preferences such as impulses of solidarity.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics , pp. 68 - 90Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003
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