Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Conditions on orderings and acceptable-set functions
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction and sketch of the main argument
- 2 The ordering principle
- 3 The independence principle
- 4 The problem of justification
- 5 Pragmatic arguments
- 6 Dynamic choice problems
- 7 Rationality conditions on dynamic choice
- 8 Consequentialist constructions
- 9 Reinterpreting dynamic consistency
- 10 A critique of the pragmatic arguments
- 11 Formalizing a pragmatic perspective
- 12 The feasibility of resolute choice
- 13 Connections
- 14 Conclusions
- 15 Postscript: projections
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
10 - A critique of the pragmatic arguments
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Conditions on orderings and acceptable-set functions
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction and sketch of the main argument
- 2 The ordering principle
- 3 The independence principle
- 4 The problem of justification
- 5 Pragmatic arguments
- 6 Dynamic choice problems
- 7 Rationality conditions on dynamic choice
- 8 Consequentialist constructions
- 9 Reinterpreting dynamic consistency
- 10 A critique of the pragmatic arguments
- 11 Formalizing a pragmatic perspective
- 12 The feasibility of resolute choice
- 13 Connections
- 14 Conclusions
- 15 Postscript: projections
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
Introduction
What I propose to do, in this and the following chapter, is to turn back to the explicitly pragmatic arguments that were surveyed in Chapter 4 and consider how compelling they really are when recast in terms of the framework of distinctions and conditions developed in Chapters 6 through 9. Since each of these arguments purports to show that the agent who violates either CF or CIND can be caught in a pragmatic difficulty, what I am particularly interested in determining is whether this sort of difficulty is one that arises for the agent regardless of whether he adopts a myopic, sophisticated, or resolute approach or whether, instead, the alleged pragmatic difficulty can be seen to be the consequence of adopting one, rather than another, of these approaches. In particular, what I want to determine is whether any one or another of these approaches can be shown to pass the test of not making the agent liable to be placed in a pragmatically untenable position.
My remarks at the very end of Chapter 5 hinted at what I am now in a position – thanks to the formal developments of Chapters 6 through 9 – to establish more firmly, that the pragmatic arguments presented there effectively beg the question of alternative approaches and assume that the agent behaves in a myopic fashion.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rationality and Dynamic ChoiceFoundational Explorations, pp. 162 - 182Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990