Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Conditions on orderings and acceptable-set functions
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction and sketch of the main argument
- 2 The ordering principle
- 3 The independence principle
- 4 The problem of justification
- 5 Pragmatic arguments
- 6 Dynamic choice problems
- 7 Rationality conditions on dynamic choice
- 8 Consequentialist constructions
- 9 Reinterpreting dynamic consistency
- 10 A critique of the pragmatic arguments
- 11 Formalizing a pragmatic perspective
- 12 The feasibility of resolute choice
- 13 Connections
- 14 Conclusions
- 15 Postscript: projections
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
9 - Reinterpreting dynamic consistency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Conditions on orderings and acceptable-set functions
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction and sketch of the main argument
- 2 The ordering principle
- 3 The independence principle
- 4 The problem of justification
- 5 Pragmatic arguments
- 6 Dynamic choice problems
- 7 Rationality conditions on dynamic choice
- 8 Consequentialist constructions
- 9 Reinterpreting dynamic consistency
- 10 A critique of the pragmatic arguments
- 11 Formalizing a pragmatic perspective
- 12 The feasibility of resolute choice
- 13 Connections
- 14 Conclusions
- 15 Postscript: projections
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
Summary
Introduction
Chapter 8 began with two constructive theorems (8.1 and 8.2) concerning CF and CIND. The conclusion finally reached, however, was that these two theorems do not suffice to establish CF and CIND as principles of rationality. In particular, certain feasibility issues remain to be resolved, and, moreover, the conceptual connection between all of the dynamic choice conditions employed in these constructions and an intuitively secure notion of consequentialism was found to be questionable.
In this chapter I shall consider Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 from a somewhat different perspective. Even if one grants that these two theorems do not settle the question whether CF and CIND are principles of rationality, still they are diagnostically useful. In particular, they serve as a reminder that if the agent employs certain methods of evaluation, he can be placed in a situation in which he is liable to choose in a manner that is dynamically inconsistent, that is, in violation of DC. Theorems 8.1 and 8.2 provide a formal model for this. They imply that if the agent's method of evaluation fails to satisfy either CF or CIND, then it will be possible to construct a decision tree in which, if the agent chooses in a manner that satisfies all of SR, NEC, and SEP, he will end up violating DC.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rationality and Dynamic ChoiceFoundational Explorations, pp. 148 - 161Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990