Democratic government is impossible without formal institutional arrangements, or rules, that fix the limits of legitimate political behavior. Rules define how elected representatives are chosen, how policies are formulated and adopted, how policies are enforced, and even how the rules for choosing policy are themselves established. Although there is an enormous variety of institutional arrangements for democratic government, almost all share one common feature: they are not neutral. Most rules create opportunities for particular individuals or groups, impose constraints on others, and thus affect who wins and who loses the competition to influence policy outcomes. Rules also create trade-offs. Some may increase the efficiency of decision making, but only at the cost of excluding certain individuals or groups from power and influence. Other rules may enhance political stability, but only by denying meaningful choices to citizens at election time. And yet other rules may ensure the inclusion of a large number of groups in decision making, but at the cost of clear accountability for policy choices. Not surprisingly, then, political elites expend enormous energies battling over the rules for political decision making.

The transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic in France provides what may be the most dramatic historical example of how changing the rules of a democracy can change the performance of that democracy. The Fourth Republic is often criticized for two related reasons. The first is executive impotence.