In this chapter, the case against fiction will be considered under two main aspects, one moral and one metaphysical. They are not mutually exclusive and often overlap, but they are best kept separate in the interests of clarity. Each aspect consists of two arguments. The moral aspect concerns the way literature a) sets bad examples and b) encourages vicarious experience. The metaphysical aspect involves the objection that c) fiction is a counterfeit form of reality and d) the existence of convincing fictions undermines the authority of truth. This chapter offers an account of each of these arguments and illustrates how each is congruent with and in many cases originates in Plato's justification of his banishment of the poets from the Republic. At each stage of this account brief mention is made of the counterarguments which in Spain, as elsewhere, were for the most part Aristotelian in form. Since the predominantly Aristotelian cast of Spanish Golden-Age literary theory is already adequately documented no attempt has been made to give a full account of these arguments here. It is, in any case, axiomatic in what follows that in certain important respects the Aristotelian defence of poetry is not at all an adequate reply to Plato, and leaves his most fundamental objections untouched.

The moral aspect

The first, that is, the most common and least subtle argument made against fiction concerns the immoral examples which it frequently offers to its readers, particularly to its young readers.