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5 - Kantianism

from Part I

Stuart Brock
Affiliation:
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
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Summary

Introduction

Kantianism is another form of global anti-realism, although Kantians tend to call themselves realists. Kantians accept all of the entities of the common-sense and scientific worldviews. They accept the existence of tables, chairs, cats, dogs, matter, forces such as gravity and so on. But they claim that all of these entities are in a sense mind-dependent and it is because of this that we classify Kantians as anti-realists.

The key distinction for Kantians is between the world as it appears to us and the world as it is in itself. The world as it is in itself is often called the “noumenal world” and things as they are apart from the way in which we perceive and understand them are called “noumena”. Kantians claim that the nature of noumena cannot be known; only the world as it appears to us – the so-called “phenomenal world” – can be discovered.

In this chapter we shall look briefly at Kantianism as it was presented by Kant himself and then provide a closer examination of the work of a modern Kantian, Hilary Putnam.

Kant

Immanuel Kant holds that we must be born with rather complex innate mental structures that allow us to interpret the world. Moreover, these structures do not mirror the nature of the world as it really is.

As we have said, Kant distinguished between the world as it is in itself – the “noumenal” world – and the world as we perceive it – the “phenomenal” world.

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Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2007

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  • Kantianism
  • Stuart Brock, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
  • Book: Realism and Anti-Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653645.005
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  • Kantianism
  • Stuart Brock, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
  • Book: Realism and Anti-Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653645.005
Available formats
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Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Kantianism
  • Stuart Brock, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
  • Book: Realism and Anti-Realism
  • Online publication: 05 February 2013
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/UPO9781844653645.005
Available formats
×