The concept of the good – or at least some concept of the good – has been a central topic in ethical theory since Plato. Moral philosophers have generally recognized a distinction between what is good only as a means and what is good in itself. The latter, often called the intrinsically good, has proved difficult to explicate and, by contrast with the former, seems to many philosophers to be mysterious. G. E. Moore sought to clarify the notion of the intrinsically good, and his theory of value was probably the most influential axiology developed in the twentieth century. The theory is closely tied to his metaphysics, his epistemology, and his normative ethics; but much of what he says about the good can be maintained without commitment to all of his major claims in those three domains. My project here is to set out a theory of intrinsic value that incorporates the best elements of Moore's account of the notion but avoids commitment to his overall view in metaethics.

I Some major elements in Moore's theory of value

Since my aim is to produce a sustainable account of intrinsic value, I must be brief in introducing the elements in Moore's account that form a good basis for critical discussion and for comparison with my view. I begin with his famous claim