Virtue ethics provides unique resources for moral thinking, and some writers and teachers in ethics consider it superior to rule theories. The most notable rule theories with which it is commonly contrasted are Kantianism, utilitarianism, and intuitionism. This paper will not systematically compare any virtue-ethical position with any rule theory in ethics, but it will bring out some resources of virtue ethics – or at least certain uses of virtue theoretic (aretaic) concepts – in both ethical theory and moral practice. Its concern extends both to enriching rule theories and to enhancing their uses in professional ethics. This extension represents an important territory, and skillfully navigating it requires both guidance by general moral standards and a capacity to make particular moral judgments.

I Virtues as traits of character

We might begin with a quite general characterization of virtues. They are traits of character that constitute praiseworthy elements in a person's psychology; specifically, praiseworthy character traits appropriate to pursuing the particular good or kind of good with respect to which the trait counts as such. Take justice and generosity as examples. The former virtue might be viewed as deontic, in that the good in question concerns what is obligatory or permissible in a moral sense, as in the case of a fair distribution of benefits to co-workers. The latter might be viewed as axiological, since the good a generous person properly aims at is characteristically enhancement of well-being, understood non-morally, as are pain and pleasure. Virtues vary along many quite different kinds of dimensions. They may be more or less deeply rooted; more or less dominating in behavior; more or less integrated with other traits the person has, including nonvirtues; and variable in many other ways.