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7 - Getting information into hazardous workplaces: OSHA's hazard identification regulations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2009

Thomas O. McGarity
Affiliation:
University of Texas, Austin
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Summary

For many decades worker exposure to toxic substances in the workplace has taken a heavy toll. Despite the efforts of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to force employers to control workplace exposure to toxic chemicals, workers still played a guinea pig role for the rest of society. As science yielded more information about chemical risks, workers began to insist that they be apprised of the risks they faced at work.

Without information about risks, workers lack the freedom to make informed career choices. They also undervalue their services in wage negotiations, because they fail to attach a risk premium to unsafe workplaces. On the other hand, evaluating and communicating risks is quite expensive, and employers are naturally reluctant to spend money informing employees when the predictable consequence will be attempts by employees to bid up wages.

Regulatory background

In 1974, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA's sister agency in the Department of Health and Human Services) published a “criteria document” urging OSHA to promulgate a hazard communication standard. After an OSHA-appointed advisory committee made similar recommendations, Ralph Nader's Health Research Group in 1975 petitioned the agency to issue a standard. Two years later, OSHA published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) discussing some of the important issues and soliciting public comment on whether it should mandate risk communication. After spending four more years studying the responses to the ANPR, OSHA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for a generic hazard identification standard as one of the many “midnight regulations” issued in the waning moments of the Carter Administration.

Type
Chapter
Information
Reinventing Rationality
The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy
, pp. 89 - 110
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1991

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