Introduction

The concept of social solidarity was given both instrumental and normative significance at the inception of the European Community by the Schuman Declaration in May 1950, which established a basis for the cohesion policies endorsed by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Some analyses appear to suggest that social solidarity as a normative concept within European discourse has declined significantly in recent decades (Józef Niżnik, Chapter Two of this volume; Arts and Gelissen, 2001). Manners (2008), however, argues that social solidarity is still represented as at least a subsidiary (but vital) norm, closely linked to associated human rights, within European discourse, and that this is a constitutive component of the European Union's (EU) ‘normative power’. Is this the case? And, if it is, what are its implications for the practice of social solidarity between Europeans, and between Europeans and non-Europeans?

This chapter first describes what is meant by the idea of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and then offers a critique based on charges of Eurocentrism and the claimed failure on the part of the EU to ‘walk the (normative) walk’. It outlines a political-economic understanding of the ways in which ‘norms’ and interests are intermeshed, with particular reference to the EU's negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with developing countries. It is concluded that the EU's claim to represent a ‘normative power’, promoting relationships of social solidarity in a positive and idealist sense, is problematic; the EU does seek to promote and support certain norms and these may or may not be constitutive of genuine social solidarity.

Normative power Europe: the concept

The concept of normative power Europe (NPE) was developed by Ian Manners as something to be distinguished from more traditional conceptions of military and civilian power. According to Manners (2002: 241):