Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-gq7q9 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T22:03:00.141Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

1 - The classic conception of rights: the “democratic deficit”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Sonu Bedi
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College, New Hampshire
Get access

Summary

How should we limit democratic government? Assuming we care about the competing values of liberty and democracy, what is the best regulatory principle for balancing them? Obviously, with no constraint on democratic government, there is nothing to thwart democratic tyranny. There is nothing to stop the polity from passing conventional sodomy laws or laws mandating racial segregation. We must limit democracy to some extent in order to ensure liberty. Alternatively, specifying all or even most of our normative obligations prior to any democratic decision-making may ensure liberty but leaves no place for democracy. We must be careful, then, not to go too far in limiting democracy. The puzzle is not whether or not to limit state power but how to do so. Consequently, I am not concerned with the following questions: Why should we limit democratic government? How do we arrive at such limits? How do we substantiate them? What are their foundations? Why do we even care about liberty and democracy? My book seeks only to answer “how”: How do we limit government so as to ensure liberty but simultaneously allow for and permit a good deal of democratic discretion?

The conventional answer employs rights to balance and realize the values of liberty and democracy. I do not interrogate the philosophical foundation of rights. Mine is an argument in political and legal theory not morality. It is an argument of application.

Type
Chapter
Information
Rejecting Rights , pp. 13 - 23
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×