Introduction

Algeria and Morocco provide contrasting case studies of how state-society relations exacerbate or mitigate the politicization of religion thereby limiting or expanding the scope of religious movements seeking representation and/or inclusion in the political arena. The mushrooming of militant Islamic movements throughout North Africa in the 1970s and 1980s generated interest and sparked debates on Islamist challenges to secularism. Yet, in spite of the demonstrable interest by national and international policy makers there were few systematic studies into why some Islamist movements succeeded in mobilizing sustained opposition against regimes in some countries while others failed to garner societal support for their bid to oust incumbent regimes. This chapter analyses the political changes that have taken place in Algeria and Morocco in the last nineteen years since the cancellation of the Algerian elections in January 1992. The question raised in this chapter is a two-pronged inquiry into significant variations between the responses of states and societal actors in Morocco and Algeria to Islamists’ challenges to the modernizing agendas of ruling regimes. I argue that a comparative inquiry into state-society interactions provides a more nuanced understanding of the role of religious authorities and state actors in facilitating or mitigating prospects for democratization. Focusing on two major states of the Maghreb – Algeria and Morocco – this chapter asks: firstly, why the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Algeria was so much more organized and capable of eliciting significant popular support for its radical anti-regime ideology and secondly, why the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Morocco was comparatively weaker, more fragmented and less able to mobilize its constituents to effectively challenge the monarchy. I have opted to use the following propositions to guide a systematic discussion of the factors contributing to the divergent case studies of Algeria and Morocco:

1. 1. Where the state is more pluralist, there exist multiple loci of legitimate authority, making it more likely that opposition (Islamic or otherwise) would be fragmented and multi-dimensional. The corollary to this proposition is that an increasingly centralized and monolithic state would be likely to have an opposition that was centrally organized and monolithic as well.

2. 2. The more closely the state is identified with traditional religious institutions, the less popular support there is for opposition movements (or groups) seeking to overthrow the state on religious grounds.