The root of the problems discussed in the previous chapter lies in the individual having the right not only to hold a religion or belief but also to be able to act in accordance with them. This makes it necessary to distinguish thought and conscience from religion and belief. It also makes it necessary to distinguish between actions which are manifestations of such beliefs and those which are not. The Court and Commission have spun a web of tortuous, and often untenable, distinctions intended to differentiate between the interests at stake.

When the interests concerned are those of the individual and of the State, then the ‘public/private’ sphere distinction is of some help, as has been seen in the context of cases relating to participation in State-run schemes. This distinction is of little relevance when the right to manifest a belief in the public sphere is itself at issue and there comes a point beyond which it is futile to attempt to evade the central question. That point was reached in the Kokkinakis case, which concerned the clash of rights between the individual wishing to spread his belief and the right of another to be protected in the enjoyment of her own, and could not be avoided. This can only be resolved by having regard to the range of limitations which might be legitimately placed upon the enjoyment of the rights articulated in Article 9(1) and which will be examined in this chapter.