We assume that the foreign policies of dynastic states were the prerogative of princes and that decisions on peace and war were taken by rulers without consulting their subjects. Though in a strictly legal sense this was true, there were conventions of governance by ‘good counsel’ that summoned princes to take the advice of their nobles and commanders before committing themselves to war (see chapter 2). Was war, though, conducted in a vacuum of public opinion before widespread participation in ‘the public sphere’, required this? It has been argued that the formation of an articulate public opinion in France only began with the onset of the civil wars in 1560–2 and did not mature until the 18th century. While we now know more about the propaganda of medieval French kings, the Renaissance is still usually held to be the domain of swaggering princes who laid down the law to their subjects and pursued wars in vindication of their honour. At times of crisis, such as 1523 or 1525, there is evidence enough for seditious pamphleteering. It will be argued in this chapter that the Kings of France, far from conducting ‘wars of magnificence’ solely for the sake of honour and with sovereign disdain for subjects’ opinions, had long been acutely aware of the need both to justify their wars and present them in such a light that their subjects would understand their motives and offer enthusiastic support. Subjects, after all, were required to pay for them. As Andrew Pettegree has aptly remarked, in this period ‘the exercise of power was always persuasive.’ Louis XI, in a passage he dictated for the Rosier des guerres, stressed the desirability of carrying his subjects with him in his wars, ‘for battle fought through common will yields victory,’ and the King should always consult wise counsellors: