Member states’ policy preferences and positions

This chapter explains variation in member states’ policy positions. In Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) I pointed out that states’ policy positions are conceptually distinct from their policy preferences. Policy positions, as defined and measured in the present study, are the policies that state representatives support at the outset of the negotiations; policy positions are therefore overt behaviour. By contrast, preferences are hidden and may or may not correspond to behavioural expressions. When explaining variation in states’ policy positions, this chapter’s point of departure is the proposition that these positions reflect states’ underlying preferences, which are defined by their national economic and political attributes. This point of departure agrees with some of the core assumptions of liberal international relations theory: in particular the core assumption that ‘[s]tates … represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposefully in world politics’, and that ‘what states want is the primary determinant of what they do’ (Moravcsik 1997: 518, 521). Similarly, Achen (2006a: 121) also suggests that states’ preferences are readily observable in their policy positions: ‘An actor’s “most preferred point” is a clear idea and relatively easy to measure.’

The proposition that states’ policy positions reflect underlying economic and political attributes is challengeable, even within the framework of liberal international relations theory. Another core assumption of liberal international relations theory is that ‘the configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behavior’ (Moravcsik 1997: 520). This means that ‘the expected behavior of any single state … reflect[s] not simply its own preferences, but the configuration of preferences of all states linked by patterns of significant policy interdependence’ (523). European Union (EU) member states certainly are linked to each other in ‘patterns of significant policy interdependence’. Research on policy networks among member states concurs that state officials often attempt to coordinate their policy positions with officials in other states (Naurin and Lindahl 2008). This may have the effect of blurring the impact of states’ economic and political attributes on their policy positions.