Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-n9wrp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-20T07:29:56.940Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Chapter 6 - Existence of a competitive equilibrium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Donald E. Campbell
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
Get access

Summary

Under ideal conditions an equilibrium of the Walrasian model of a private ownership market economy is Pareto optimal. The fact that these ideal conditions are not met without qualification in the real world does not vitiate the Walrasian approach to welfare economics, if only because Walrasian competitive equilibrium can be viewed as a standard to which policy-makers can aspire. The results of this book would be of little value, however, if it turned out that an equilibrium rarely exists. This chapter examines the conditions under which existence of equilibrium is assured.

Competitive behavior is assumed throughout. Other notions of equilibrium are more plausible in certain situations, but competitive behavior is important enough for a study of competitive equilibrium to constitute a useful introduction to the subject of existence of equilibrium. By assuming competitive behavior, we can be more specific about the features of a resource allocation mechanism. Accordingly, attention will be confined to mechanisms that require each agent to transmit a best response to the messages announced by others. A best response is one that would produce the best outcome for the decision-maker if the messages of others were to remain unchanged. If an agent's strategy has this property, his behavior is said to be competitive.

It is often claimed that proofs of existence of equilibrium constitute a mere mathematical flourish and are not worthy of study by anyone whose interest in economics stems from a desire to understand and prescribe for real-world phenomena.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1987

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×