The aim of this chapter is to find a place for both emotion and responsibility in our assessment of character. We find that in the course of our everyday lives, we judge people on the basis of their emotions – their warmth, spontaneity, and so on – as well as on the basis of their actions. Furthermore, these judgments seem objective; we treat them as if they were about the worth of the people we judge. However, it seems there are parts of our emotional selves that are not within our control, even with intense, long-range effort.

The problem is how to ground objective judgments about character that appreciates that much is under our control, but that some is not. Unfortunately, the tradition that has found the most sensible location for choice, responsibility, and objectivity, the Kantian, precludes an honorable place for these unchosen feelings. We argue that this difficulty can be repaired once we see that Kant's exclusion of emotion relies on a faulty psychological model of the emotions working with an overly narrow conception of character. We wish to give the emotions a home in judgments of character without evicting responsibility. Let us start with why Kant attempted the eviction.

Kantian thought on emotion

A Kantian chapter on emotion and responsibility is easy to write and quick to read: The domain of the moral is the domain of the will expressed in action; it is the domain of that for which we are responsible. Emotions are beyond the will, and for this reason have no intrinsic moral value.