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4 - What Works Best?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2010

James R. Barth
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Alabama
Gerard Caprio
Affiliation:
Williams College, Massachusetts
Ross Levine
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
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Summary

The more extensive a man's knowledge of what has been done, the greater will be his power of knowing what to do.

Disraeli

It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.

Mark Twain

GOALS AND BOUNDARIES

Goals

This chapter assesses the book's central question: which bank regulatory and supervisory strategies work best? As stressed in Chapter 1, three inter-related motivations drive this chapter's analyses. First, because banks importantly influence economic growth, poverty alleviation, and economic volatility (Levine, 2005a), it is critical to identify those policies that encourage efficient bank operations. Consequently, this chapter provides the first broad, cross-country assessment of a variety of regulations to determine which ones enhance bank development, stability, efficiency, performance, and the degree of corruption in bank lending. Second, the Basel Committee routinely makes influential recommendations for countries to adopt regarding bank regulatory and supervisory strategies. As described in Chapter 2, it most recently recommended Basel II, which is based on three pillars: capital standards, official supervision, and market discipline, respectively. This chapter provides the first cross-country assessment of the relative merits of these three “pillars.” Third, our inquiry about what works best in bank regulation and supervision bears directly on the epic debate on the proper role of government in an economy. From before the Federalist Papers, philosophers, political scientists, and economists have warned about the adverse repercussions of unchecked power of any branch of government.

Type
Chapter
Information
Rethinking Bank Regulation
Till Angels Govern
, pp. 178 - 257
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2005

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  • What Works Best?
  • James R. Barth, Auburn University, Alabama, Gerard Caprio, Williams College, Massachusetts, Ross Levine, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Rethinking Bank Regulation
  • Online publication: 06 July 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753817.006
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  • What Works Best?
  • James R. Barth, Auburn University, Alabama, Gerard Caprio, Williams College, Massachusetts, Ross Levine, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Rethinking Bank Regulation
  • Online publication: 06 July 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753817.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • What Works Best?
  • James R. Barth, Auburn University, Alabama, Gerard Caprio, Williams College, Massachusetts, Ross Levine, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Rethinking Bank Regulation
  • Online publication: 06 July 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753817.006
Available formats
×