Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Consent: Nuremberg, Helsinki and beyond
- 2 Information and communication: the drift from agency
- 3 Informing and communicating: back to agency
- 4 How to rethink informed consent
- 5 Informational privacy and data protection
- 6 Genetic information and genetic exceptionalism
- 7 Trust, accountability and transparency
- Some conclusions and proposals
- Bibliography
- Institutional sources and documents
- Index
3 - Informing and communicating: back to agency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Consent: Nuremberg, Helsinki and beyond
- 2 Information and communication: the drift from agency
- 3 Informing and communicating: back to agency
- 4 How to rethink informed consent
- 5 Informational privacy and data protection
- 6 Genetic information and genetic exceptionalism
- 7 Trust, accountability and transparency
- Some conclusions and proposals
- Bibliography
- Institutional sources and documents
- Index
Summary
We have seen that the conduit and container metaphors emphasise some elements of information and communication whilst downplaying others. We suggested that this happens when we rely too much on conceptions of ‘information’ that are detached from action. A ‘drift from agency’ easily happens if we think of information as a kind of quasi-spatial semantic stuff – stuff that is about things – that can be possessed, conveyed, disclosed, acquired, used, and so on. In Chapter 2 we exposed the ‘highlighting’ and ‘hiding’ effects of these metaphors; in this chapter we aim to say something more about the key elements and aspects of communication that tend to be ‘hidden’ by incautious use of the conduit and container metaphors. By the end of this chapter we will have two ‘models’ of information and communication in play: the conduit/container model and what we shall call ‘the agency model’. We hope then to be well placed to rethink informed consent, and to discuss certain other normative questions that bear on ‘informational’ issues.
AGENCY
There are many kinds of communicative behaviour, and we shall not discuss the full range. For example, we shall not discuss unintentional communication, important as it often is. The clothes that we wear, our posture, certain hand gestures or movements of the eyes may be viewed as ‘communicating’ something about our social status, our interests, our emotional states, our trustworthiness, and so on. The person wearing no-longer-fashionable shoes may not intend to communicate anything at all by wearing them.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics , pp. 50 - 67Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007