The early political economists bernard mandeville and Adam Smith proclaimed the rationality of the market to be the universal form of rationality and justice that society should follow in all its spheres. It was not the only attempt at raising a sphere-immanent value to a universal one. Similar attempts were made by adherents of the rationality of bureaucratic administration and of that of science. But they were less explicit, less interesting, and less momentous.

Can't we exclude the possibility of universal rationality from the beginning? This is what Weber seems to imply when he distinguishes “rationality of means” (Zweckrationalität, instrumental rationality) from “rationality of value” (Wertrationalität, practical rationality). He assumed that only the former can claim universal obligation but cannot raise justice claims, while the second can raise justice claims but cannot claim universal obligation. There is an obvious objective standard for deciding whether it is right to choose a means for a given end, but there seems to be no such standard for deciding if it is right to choose an end. Nevertheless, political economists argued that economic standards are such standards.

When in 1714 Mandeville republished his Fable of the Bees under the subtitle Private Vices, Publick Benefits, he marked out the fable's claim to reform our moral ideas: What traditionally have been considered vices – egoism, lavishness, exploitation, pride, and aggressiveness – are vices only in private.