In my study of the role of imagination, the debt I owe to scholars like McFague, Black and Barbour, among others, must be evident. In particular I have derived great benefit from reading Sallie McFague's writings on models and metaphorical theology. In conclusion I would like to comment briefly on some important issues McFague introduces concerning the proper criteria for judging the success of theological models. I want to relate these issues to my metaethical models of rights.

Some of the criteria mentioned by McFague have been implicit in the initial discussion of metaphors and models in chapter five. For instance, a good model is fairly comprehensive, taking into account diverse dimensions of experience, being ‘extensible’, i.e. capable of expansion and application to novel areas or topics. In relation to rights-language we applied this criterion when trying to judge the value of simple metaphors or models like the ‘safety net’, ‘the flashing light’, and ‘the chain’.

Another criterion used to judge models involves consistency. Here we can think of internal consistency, where the concern is with the ways in which various parts of the model fit together without contradiction; and we can also consider external consistency whereby one model does not contradict another related model. Thus, we have been interested in showing that the ‘freedom’ and ‘power’ models of rights are consistent in themselves and between themselves. Another criterion is implicit in the criterion of external consistency. It follows from the point that one model is hardly ever sufficient on its own to express the full meaning of the topic being explored.