In certain respects, Roman law could be surprisingly egalitarian. Once a case came to trial, particularly, the court was supposed to decide between one case and the other, not one person and the other (at least in theory; for the practice, see Chapter 7). Still, Roman society was one in which it could be openly asserted that some people were simply better than others, and the law recognized some of these hierarchies (e.g., free persons vs. slaves). Other status differences might be claimed to exist in natural fact (minors vs. full adults) or on political rather than personal grounds (e.g., citizenship). The most complex and important of these issues have to do with gender, and the position of women in Roman law will get its own chapter (Chapter 16). This chapter will treat all the other distinctions of status just mentioned.

FREEDOM AND SLAVERY

Many societies have some form or another of “involuntary servitude” (as the American Constitution describes it) or compulsory labor. Rome (in common with the American South) had the rarer and stronger institution of “chattel” slavery. That is, not only were some human beings compelled to labor or follow the orders of others, but they were actually subject to the laws that governed property of other types. In principle, parts of the law of persons could have been applied at the same time. In fact, as we will see, the “thing”ness of Roman slaves stayed constant over the centuries, but their “person”ness varied.