Introduction

It is widely held that voting in the course of ordinary elections has no significant influence on the constitutional regime or order of a country. If voters have any influence at all on the constitutional set-up, which not everybody sees as evident, this is generally considered to occur only on the relatively rare occasions when constitutional questions are submitted to a referendum or to a specially elected convention or constitutional assembly. At least three arguments are provided to support that opinion. A logical consideration comes first. Ordinary elections are parts of the political game and thus logically take place within the rules of that game – that is, within the constitutional order or regime of the country. To assume that, at the same time as they play, players can change the rules is, to say the least, logically puzzling. The second argument refers to the motivations and possibilities of voters. Voters, this argument says, are not really interested in constitutional issues and, even if they were, are particularly ill equipped to understand their implications. The third argument rests on the observation of what obtains in practice. As a matter of fact, constitutional issues are generally absent from electoral platforms and campaigns.

In spite of its apparent strength, I will try to show that this threepronged denial is not compelling. To defend the opposite view – that voters do exercise a substantial influence on constitutional matters simply by the way they vote in ordinary elections – I will endeavor to neutralize each of the three arguments mentioned above.